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Mexico's Transition to Neo-liberalism 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is often accused of forcing countries to enact 
neo-liberal policies. As the international lender of last resort, it is to the IMF that countries turn 
when faced with extreme difficulties in their balance of payments or exchange rate stability_ 
Since it was founded, the IMF has had the power to make its financial assistance conditional 
upon certain economic policy reforms. In the last twenty years, the IMF has made increased use 
of these powers; meanwhile, the IMF has embraced the neo-liberal policies of the Washington 
Consensus. Not all countries that have needed IMF assistance wanted to enact these policies, 
and many critics have alleged that the IMF has used its position to compromise national 
sovereignty. In 1982, facing an economic crisis, Mexico announced that it would have to place a 
three month moratorium on repayment of its massive external debt, beginning what came to be 
known as the Debt Crisis in the developing world. This crisis left the country in need of IMF 
assistance. For the twelve years prior to the crisis, Mexico had been governed under a statist-
populist regime whose policies differed significantly from those required by the IMF as a 
condition of its aid. I began my investigation of the Mexican transition to a neo-liberal regime 
expecting to find that the IMF was largely responsible for the shift. However, closer 
investigation revealed that the shift was primarily generated internally. 
While there was international pressure on Mexico to alter its policies, in this paper I will 
argue that the shift was primarily caused by the failure of the statist-populist model and by 
changes in the domestic balance of power between classes. In order to stem the impending debt 
crisis, President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) had taken a number of dramatic steps in 1982. 
In February, the peso was devalued. In August dollar denominated bank accounts were forcibly 
converted to pesos at an unfavorable rate, evaporating large amounts of middle class savings. In 
September the banking system was nationalized. These steps left the middle classes and the 
business sector in shock, and the government--and the statist-populist regime--lost all credibility 
in their eyes. 
When the crisis struck, many believed it was a problem of liquidity, not solvency: that 
Mexico's economy was capable of generating enough income to repay the debt, but did not have 
enough dollars in the short term to make the external payments due in dollars. The political 
fallout that ensued was, in contrast, a crisis of solvency, of governing legitimacy. The Partido 
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI), having ruled Mexico for decades, lost its support among the 
middle classes and business classes, support that was crucial to its maintenance of power. A 
radical shift was required if the PRI was to continue its rule. It took form in the neo-libera1 
policies of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) and the IMF program. The middle classes 
and the business sector rejected the statist-populist system of government in favor of neo-liberal 
policies, and they carried sufficient economic and political weight to require a change. 
The International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund, founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in July of 
1944, was born of the economic problems of the first half of the twentieth century. In the 
aftermath of W orId War I, the economic links between the belligerent countries weakened. 
During the Great Depression, countries put up significant trade barriers. Most Western policy 
makers believed that the low levels of trade in the interwar years and low level of economic 
interdependence had contributed to the conditions that precipitated the Second W orId War. Thus, 
they thought rebuilding war ravaged economies and increasing world economic ties were 
important measures for preventing future conflagrations. Many familiar programs and 
institutions were created either partly or wholly as a result of this logic, including the IMF, 
World Bank, and the Marshall Plan. 
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In line with policy makers' concerns, the IMF's mandate was, in short, to facilitate the 
expansion of trade. This in tum required exchange rate stability and financial liquidity, primary 
concerns of the IMF to this day. Seeking stability of exchange rates, with some flexibility, a 'par 
value' system was implemented. All currencies would have a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate 
with the U.S. dollar, which would in tum be pegged to gold. Each currency's par value would be 
allowed to fluctuate within boundaries of one percent of the fixed rate, or parity. Changing this 
fixed rate required consent of the IMF, which could be contingent upon a country meeting 
certain conditions. l The IMF also made available to countries conditional financial assistance in 
maintaining the existing rate. In the first decades of the IMF' s existence, these conditions, 
typically mild, consisted mostly of fiscal and monetary adjustments the IMF deemed necessary 
to maintain parity, and sometimes a reduction in the barriers to trade--tariffs, quotas, etc. 
By the late 1960s, this system had developed a number of problems. The 1970s was a 
period of difficulty and uncertainty, both in the international economy and at the IMF. 
Following the lead of the United States, most industrialized countries switched to some form of a 
flexible exchange rate regime--effectively ending the Bretton Woods system--and none have 
required an IMF financial rescue since 1976? More so than before, then, the IMF's clientele 
became developing countries exclusively. Meanwhile, in the 1970s commercial banks began 
lending larger amounts to sovereign states--mostly developing countries--further drawing clients 
away from the Fund. Mexico was among those countries that used private sector loans to fuel 
development and maintain equilibrium in its balance of payments. Despite attempts to tailor new 
facilities to developing country use, the IMF was in an uncomfortable position of reduced 
influence and relevance. 
The IMF made adjustments to respond to this situation. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the IMF made several attempts to increase the size of its resources. This required the 
consent of the largest economies; these countries insisted that the IMF make greater use of its 
powers of conditionality. In 1978 amendments were made to the IMF Articles that, an10ng other 
things, increased the IMF's power to make its loans conditional. This was followed around 1980 
by the development of the Washington Consensus, named after the location of its most 
aggressive proponents--the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. government, particularly the 
Treasury Department. The Consensus was based on neo-1ibera1 ideology, including the neo-
classical paradigm in economics, which had risen to prominence in policy circles in the late 
1970s. Policies encouraged under the Consensus include the following: an emphasis on the 
market system as allocator of resources; elimination of wage and price controls, subsidies, 
barriers to trade and capital flows, and other policies that distort market signals; privatization of 
state-owned enterprises; and deregulation of economic activity. 
These developments were followed by the debt crisis, which afflicted much of the 
developing world. The crisis was first acknowledged with the temporary suspension of interest 
payments by Mexico in August of 1982, with n1any countries following suit. Even before the 
extent of the cl;sis was fully understood, commercial banks ceased lending to developing 
countries at anything but unfavorable terms--typically short term loans at high interest rates. 
I Harper, p. 96. 
2 Polak, p. 12. 
Most countries were forced to tum to the IMF for assistance in meeting debt payments and 
maintaining their balance of payn1ents and stabi lity in exchange rates. 
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With the increased powers of conditionality granted it in 1978, the IMF was able to make 
its loans contingent upon meeting certain criteria. Most countries that fell victim to the debt 
crisis were in desperate need of IMF assistance and accepted the conditions, regardless of 
whether or not domestic policymakers found them palatable. Thus, the neo-classical policies 
called for in the Washington Consensus were implemented in many countries that otherwise 
would not have adopted them, or would have done so with less stringency. 
Economic Ideas and Ideologies in Mexico 
To understand the context in which the shift to neo-liberalism took place, one must 
examine the economic and political ideas and ideologies prevalent in Mexico at the time. 
Untangling economic ideology and economic 'reality' is difficult. However, it will be useful to 
examine the different ideologies that were influential in Mexico in order to better understand the 
actions of actors within the economy, and resulting changes in the economy. 
A person's understanding of the world affects their decisions and actions. This holds true 
for economic decisions. The history, policy, theory, and 'reality' of an economy interact with 
each other in a complex fashion, and each actor in an economy (e.g. people, households, 
governments, businesses) has their own conceptions and understandings of these. These beliefs 
about an economy or economic policy, regardless of their accuracy, can fundamentally alter the 
economy. An example of this, one often seen in Mexico, is the phenomenon of capital flight. If 
the government implements a policy to redistribute income, it will be viewed by some as a step 
toward increasing domestic demand and by others as a step toward socialism. In Mexico, those 
believing the latter have in the past voiced their objection to redistributive measures through 
capital flight, which in tum affects the economy, including the viability of a program of 
redistribution. Examples of this type abound and are often complex. 
In Latin America and in Mexico, two issues stand out as primary in debates regarding 
economic policy: first, should development strategy be outward oriented and export-led, or 
inward-looking and manufacturing-led; second, are markets effective resource and income 
allocators, or is it necessary for the state to playa significant role in allocation. In both cases the 
former position is associated with orthodox models of the economy and the latter position with 
heterodox models. However, there is clearly a great deal of gray area between these polar 
positions, and important modes of economic thought in Mexico (e.g. Keynesian) do not fit neatly 
into this framework. There exists no simple classification scheme of economic thought in 
Mexico. 
'Orthodox' theories of the economy--classical, neo-classical, and monetarist--have been 
influential in Latin America and in Mexico, both with important internal factions and with 
powerful countries and international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund. 
Their primary feature is an emphasis on markets as allocators of resources and output--a 
country's natural resource endowment and comparative advantage in trade, in the context of free 
trade and free capital movements, will determine the most effective use of labor and capital and 
their appropriate rewards. Barriers to trade and capital flows, wage and price controls, and 
government subsidies all distort market signals and cause inefficient allocation of resources. The 
export sector is seen as a primary engine of growth in a developing economy. The role of the 
state is to develop and enforce the rules by which markets function, but to remain largely outside 
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of the economic sphere. In the 1980s orthodox models took institutional form in the Washington 
Consensus. 
Historically, countries in Latin America have often had large export sectors based on 
prinlary products. Manufactured goods tended to be in1ported rather than produced domestically. 
Much of Latin America, including Mexico, enjoyed strong economic growth under export-led 
economies from the 1880s to the Great Depression. While growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was often high, the skewed distribution of wealth that typically occurred under these 
regimes often engendered social problems. In Mexico, this problem was one of the causes of the 
Mexican Revolution. 3 Subsequently, both of the World Wars created an export boom for 
Mexico, but availability of consumer goods and manufactured imports in general was reduced 
due to the focus of the industrialized economies on production of war goods. Between the wars, 
the Great Depression witnessed a perilous drop in world demand, crushing export markets for 
Mexico and other developing countries. In addition to causing recession throughout the 
economy, this reduced Mexico's ability to purchase imports. Thus, the period from 1914-1945 
saw great volatility in the export sector and frequent unavailability of imports (see table 1). It 
was during this period that some economists began to note that Latin America faced declining 
terms of trade: the prices of its exports did not rise as quickly as the prices of its imports, leading 
to a decline in export purchasing power over time. Partly as a result of this, Latin American 
countries tended towards frequent balance of payments problems.4 
Table 1: Volatility in the External Sector 
Year Exports/GDP (Exports + Imports)/GDP 
1928 31.4 47.7 
1938 13.9 25.5 
Source: Bulmer-Thomas, p. 195 
Structuralism developed in part as a response to these dilemmas. Along with 
Dependency Theory, Structuralism is one of two economic paradigms that originated and 
developed largely in Latin America, both having gone on to have a significant influence 
throughout the world. Structuralists were an10ng the first to note, and make an econon1ic 
argument in favor of, industrialization in Latin America. Industrialization, essentially, consists 
of the accumulation of capital and technology and their deployment in an increasingly complex 
and productive manner. Joseph Love writes that, "Industrialization in Latin America was fact 
before it was policy, and policy before it was theory."s Impressed by these problems that had led 
to incipient industrialization, by the 1930s many Latin An1ericans had come to see 
industrialization as a desirable goal. In Mexico, this was reinforced by the desire on the part of 
many for economic modernization, an important force since the Porfiriato. The Structuralist 
school, which dominated the United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), provided important theoretical justification for a sustained program of 
industrialization.6 
3 Meyer, p. 481-83. 
4 Love, p. 408. 
5 ibid, p. 395. 
6 ibid, P 393-423. Though the name 'Structuralism' was taken on in the context of the debate with Monetarists in 
The Structuralists saw market-led development as inadequate and argued a need for a 
more active state. They proposed that Latin American countries pursue a program of Import 
Substitution Industrialization (lSI), the goals of which were to reduce imports and industrialize, 
with the purpose of alleviating the problems mentioned above. The state would encourage 
industry through a number of measures, including protective tariffs, credit subsidies, tax breaks, 
and the provision of cheap food in urban industrial centers. In theory, the program would 
progress through stages from light to heavy industry, targeting at each stage those goods that 
were previously imported. The desired result was an industrial base and decreased reliance in 
imports, alleviating balance of payments problems and the terms of trade problem. 
As Structuralist thought was developing in the 1930s, the economic thought of John 
Maynard Keynes was rising to prominence. Keynes and his followers argue that the macro-
economy does not necessarily tend toward full-employment equilibrium as orthodox micro-
economic theory holds, particularly in the short run. Thus, a potential need exists for 
government to fix market failures through various economic levers. These policies can be 
grouped into the categories of monetary and fiscal. An example of monetary policy is the 
reduction of the interest rate to stimulate investment. An example of fiscal policy is increasing 
government spending to create employment and incomes. Such measures are short-term 
correctives, and in the long nm the Keynesian model mirrors orthodoxy. 
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Antonio Ortiz Mena, secretary of the treasury from 1958-70, developed for Mexico a 
model of 'stabilizing growth' that was very influential in Mexico from 1958 to 1982. Mexico 
was to maintain fiscal and monetary restraint--keeping budget deficits low and the growth of the 
money supply in check. This would keep inflation low and the peso stable. Ortiz Mena believed 
that Mexico's low savings rate placed a constraint on growth and that borrowing to raise more 
funds for investment could increase growth. He believed Mexico would obtain high returns on 
its investments, increasing the GDP and enabling Mexico to pay back its loans as they came 
due.7 In the 1970s there was a 'hyper-Keynesian' or 'Cambridge' Keynesian approach in 
Mexican policy circles. This school argued for a need for income redistribution. This would 
increase domestic demand by increasing the purchasing power of the poor, who have a higher 
propensity to consume. This in tum would raise profits and stimulate growth. The Mexican 
policymakers influenced by this school argued that Mexico had excess supply, and that domestic 
demand could be raised without causing inflation through matching increases in supply. Deficits 
and foreign borrowing were accepted as means for paying for redistributive measures.8 
In all of the heterodox models of the economy some measure of state intervention is 
either allowed or encouraged, but they did not converge into agreement on just what the state 
should in fact do. Though elements of some reinforced each other, their proponents did not 
necessarily agree on economic policy. The Mexican policy making elite did not as a group 
conform to a particular doctrine. Further, as in any country, varying interests pulled economic 
policy making in different directions. According to James Cypher, Mexico's economic policy 
was "pragmatic, incremental, and nondoctrinaire." At times policies contradicted one another.9 
regards to the sources of inflation, the Structuralist departure from orthodoxy was inspired at least in part by 
observations of and reactions to Latin American problems with respect to terms of trade and differential productivity 
vis-a.-vis the developed countries. 
7 Cypher, p 61. 
8 ibid, P 89. 
9 ibid, P 15. 
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Political Influences on Economic Policy 
As in any country, Mexico's economic ideologies and practices are inextricably linked to 
its social and political ideologies and practices. Much of Mexico's political discourse calls upon 
traditions and themes of the Revolution of 1910. The Revolution brought an end to the 
Porfiriato, the period named after the Jefe Maximo who ruled Mexico from 1876-1910, Porfirio 
Diaz. Mexico had enjoyed political stability under Diaz for the first time since its independence 
from Spain in 1821, setting the stage for a long period of economic growth and incipient 
industrialization. Mexico's intellectuals and political leaders valued economic growth and 
modernization, and these became important social goals. Foreign investment was encouraged, 
and U.S. and European firms took advantage of Mexico's resources, including mineral wealth, 
oil, and cheap labor. However, inequality in the distribution of wealth and income, foreign 
control of domestic resources, and Diaz's insistence on running for reelection in 1910, among 
other factors, incited frustration, and in 1910, revolution. lo 
There were several factions that opposed Diaz, some of them with quite different 
agendas. Some of the Revolutionaries were moderate and sought only to replace the aging Diaz 
to advance their own agenda or to continue economic growth under a less authoritarian regime. 
More radical factions, led by Pancho Villa in the North and Emilio Zapata in the South, called 
for improvement of the lot of peasants and workers and even economic equality. In 1917 a 
Constitution was forged between these factions, each pressing different versions. The result was 
a document that attempted to live up to differing Revolutionary ideals and contained ambiguities. 
Though violence continued and many of the radicals were killed, including Villa and Zapata, the 
Constitution survived and the government that ruled under it had to attempt to build a consensus 
as a foundation on which to govern. In the short tern1 this was often accon1plished through 
repression of opposition, but attempts were made to solidify a social pact that could endure. The 
victors of the Revolution sought not only a stable government but also enduring control of 
Mexico. They attempted to incorporate all of the important social forces into their political 
party, which, after two name changes, is now known as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(pRJ).ll 
Several features of the Constitution warrant attention. Two ideals errlbodied in the 
document and the consensus that emerged from it in the 1920s and 30s were modernization and 
equality.l2 Both social rights and individual rights were recognized. The nationalist and populist 
spirit of the Revolution was blended with the liberal ideals and drive for modernization 
influential in the Porfiriato. The government was given a prominent role in the direction of the 
economy and to the executive branch was delegated much of the political power. Article 27 
reserved for the state ultimate control of Mexico's land and mineral wealth. Article 123 
recognized fundamental rights of labor and was used to justify minimum wages and limitation of 
hours. Article 3 mandated universal education. l3 
Fighting continued even after the implementation of the Constitution. Gradually, though, 
the leaders of the Revolution, now the leaders of the government, shifted from repressive means 
of control to the development of a stable and permanent social consensus. This project came to 
full fnlition under Lazaro Cardenas, president of Mexico from 1934-1940. This was 
10 Meyer, p. 481-83. 
II Newell and Rubio, p. 41-71. 
12 Newell and Rubio, p. 34. 
13 ibid, p. 30-32. 
accomplished in part by the perception that Cardenas, in contrast to his predecessors, was living 
up to the ideals of the Revolution. Invoking Article 27 of the Constitution, Cardenas 
nationalized the oil industry, an important event in the development of the Mexican national 
consciousness. As the industry was largely U.S. owned and operated, nationalization was seen 
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as a victory against the 'colossus of the north' and a matter of pride for Mexico. 14 Subsequently 
many industries thought to be of particular importance were nationalized or created by the state. 
Nationalization, then, though it had important economic effects, was frequently a political and 
cultural decision. The Cardenas administration also represents the height of populism in Mexico, 
though the perceived need to spread the benefits of the Revolution to all Mexicans remains an 
important force in Mexico to this day. Cardenas organized the redistribution of significant 
amounts of land to peasants. 
The PRI maintained its power in Mexico for several decades by formally or informally 
bringing each significant group into an alliance with the PRI and taking measures to delegitimize 
or repress groups that would not join. Peasants and labor were both organized into official 
unions and confederations of unions, the leadership of which was usually chosen by the PRI. 
Their incorporation into the governing consensus provided raw numbers of support and followed 
up on the more radical ideals of the Revolution, at least in name. The military, which had been a 
volatile political force in Mexico since the Revolution, was professionalized and depoliticized, 
and by the 1940s was not a significant player in the political arena. From the middle classes 
came most of the original Revolutionaries and the bureaucrats that followed them. Despite this 
power enjoyed by some individuals, the middle classes as a group did not have official 
connections to the PRI. 
The business sector was not explicitly incorporated into the PRI either. The govemn1ent 
set up Chambers of Commerce and Industry, but the business sector did not have channels of 
representation as direct as that of peasants and labor. IS This was despite the role the business 
sector was called upon to play in the modernization of Mexico through economic growth and 
industrialization. The PRI itself was strongly associated with the goal of bringing about an 
industrialized country, including through state-led economic development. I6 Industrialists and 
businessmen, though not powerful or well organized in the wake of the Revolution, would play 
an increasingly important role in Mexican society.17 
The PRI established firm political control of Mexico through the incorporation of diverse 
social groups and through the control and manipulation of national symbols and ideals. The 
latter was accomplished in part through extensive state involvement in the media. The PRI 
became synonymous with the government itself. The PRI, then, carried several banners of the 
Mexican social and political consciousness: nationalism, populism and economic equity, and 
economic modernization and industrialization; waving them all at the same time would prove 
difficult. 
Import Substitution Industrialization 
As far back as the Porfiriato, industrialization and economic modernization have been 
important goals in Mexico. The export volatility and loss of imports experienced between the 
14 Ross, p. 99. 
15 Newell and Rubio, p 46. 
16 Meyer, p. 614. 
17 Newell and Rubio, p 53. 
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World Wars reinforced Mexico's desire to develop its industrial base and increase its economic 
self-sufficiency. Like many Latin American countries during this period, Mexico implemented 
as the centerpiece of its development strategy a program that is now referred to as Import 
Substitution Industrialization (lSI). This was not an implementation of Structuralist doctrine, but 
a program derived from an eclectic mix of policy influences and a reaction to previous problems. 
Under lSI a country attempts to reduce its need for imports and increase its 
manufacturing base. These goals reinforce each other, as developing countries typically import 
manufactured goods. Many policy tools can be utilized to accomplish this goal. Tariffs or 
imports quotas can be used to mitigate the impact of foreign competition. Credit subsidies and 
tax breaks can be used to encourage the development of domestic industries. An appropriate 
cOlYlbination of these policies can, at least in theory, allow a country to substitute domestic 
production for those goods coming in from abroad. 
Although not always the case in practice, in theory lSI entails a progression of 
development from light--low capital, low technology--industry to heavy industry. A country first 
makes investments in agriculture, particularly irrigation and transportation, and develops simple 
production techniques, especially industries for its primary products. As capital and technical 
prowess accumulate, intermediate goods and later capital goods are produced. These latter two 
phases are more difficult--bringing a country into competition with more developed countries 
and requiring significant investments in capital goods, most of which must be imported from 
abroad. In practice the lines between these phases are not clearly drawn. 
Stabilizing Development18 
Mexico was a founding member of the IMF and received the first IMF loan in 1948. In 
the first decade after World War II, Mexico required some IMF assistance to maintain the value 
of the peso, and in 1953 and 1954, there was further exchange rate difficulty and a substantial 
amount of capital flight. There were devaluations in both years, both of which were broadly 
opposed. This experience was traumatic for policymakers and contributed to the perceived need 
to maintain the exchange rate, even at high cost. Maintaining favorable external conditions was 
viewed as critical to the success of Mexico's strategy for economic developnlent. From 1955 to 
1975, the peso traded at 12.50 to the dollar. Mexico did not access IMF resources again until 
1976. 
The period 1958-1970 came to be known as the era of 'Stabilizing Development,' in 
which growth rates were high, inflation was low, and the exchange rate was stable (see table 1). 
The latter two of these were no small accomplishment for Latin American countries, and Mexico 
was heralded as a tremendous economic success. 
Several factors contributed to this success. The administrations of both Adolfo Lopez 
Mateos (1958-1964) and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) fostered good relations with the 
business sector and the latter leaned toward economic modernization versus equality. This pro-
business appearance helped bolster investor confidence. 19 Fiscal deficits were kept to reasonable 
levels. The Banco de Mexico kept reserve requirements high, and the Banco transferred these 
funds to the Treasury, helping to finance the deficits.2o Since they were easily financed, there 
was little pressure to increase tax revenues. Public and private investment were both high, 
18 desarrollo estabilizador 
19 Newell and Rubio, p. 108. 
20 Fitzgerald, p. 34. 
expanding aggregate supply and helping to clear bottlenecks in the economy. External 
conditions were favorable. Through most of the period, growth and import demand were high, 
both worldwide and in the United States, Mexico's main trading partner. U.S. inflation was 
relatively low, especially compared to the 1970s, meaning imported inflation was low. 
Table 2: Economic performance in the era of 'Stabilizing Development' 
Year Real GDP, 0/0 Real GDP, 0/0 Wholesale Consumer 
increase increase per capita Prices, Prices, 
0/0 Increase 0/0 In crease 
1958 11.1 7.5 4.4 12.2 
1959 7.2 3.6 1.1 2.5 
1960 13.4 9.7 4.9 4.8 
1961 4.9 1.5 0.8 1.9 
1962 4.7 1.2 1.9 0.9 
1963 8.0 4.4 0.4 0.7 
1964 11.7 7.9 4.3 2.4 
Lopez Mateos 
Sexenio Average 8.3 4.7 2.2 2.2 
(1959-64) 
1965 6.5 2.9 2.0 3.5 
1966 6.9 3.4 1.2 4.2 
1967 6.3 2.7 2.9 3.0 
1968 8.1 4.5 2.0 1.4 
1969 6.3 2.7 2.5 3.5 
1970 6.9 3.2 5.8 5.0 
Diaz Ordaz 
Sexenio Average 6.8 3.2 2.7 3.4 
(1964-70) 
Source: calculated from data III IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
1968 Crisis 
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Despite the successes of the period, many people in Mexico perceived that the benefits of 
Mexico's Stabilizing Development were not being properly allocated and that the political 
process was too oligarchic. Between 1958 and 1968, the distribution of income deteriorated in 
Mexico. The Gini Coefficient rose from .450 in 1958 to .526 in 1968 (see table 2).21 In the same 
period, the share of income of the bottom seven tenths of Mexican society decreased (see table 
3). The frustration over these shifts in income distribution was aggravated by the perception that 
the Diaz Ordaz adn1inistration favored modernization and the business sector over equality and 
peasants and workers.22 
21 The Gini Coefficient is a measure of the distribution of income. It ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is perfect equality 
and 1 is complete equality. 
22 Newell and Rubio, p. 108 
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Table 3: Gini Coefficient 
1950 1958 1963 1968 1970 1975 1977 1983 1984 1989 
Gini 
Coefficient .516 .450 .527 .526 .496 .570 .496 .499 .429 .469 
, . 
Source: !NEGI, Estadzstzcas Hzstorzcas de Mexzco. 
Table 4: Percent of income, by income group 
Income groupa 1958 1968 
I 2.32 1.21 
II 3.21 2.21 
III 4.06 3.04 
IV 4.98 4.23 
V 6.02 5.07 
VI 7.49 6.46 
VII 8.29 8.28 
VIII 10.73 11.39 
IX 17.20 6.06 
Xa 10.24 14.90 
Xb 25.46 27.15 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: INEGI, Estadisticas Historicas De Mexico. 
a: Each income group contains ten percent of the population, with the exception ofXa and Xb, each of which 
contain five percent of the population. I is the poorest ten percent of the population. X is the wealthiest ten percent 
of the population. 
As in several countries in 1968, a student movement protested the perceived abuses of 
their government. A generation had grown up with Pancho Villa and Emilio Zapata as heroes, 
and perceived a stark contrast between the Revolutionary ideals and Mexico's reality. Steeped in 
leftist rhetoric, this movement sought a more democratic political process and a more equitable 
distribution of income. As this movement was growing, the government was making 
preparations to host the Summer Olympics in Mexico City. The government wanted it to be a 
proud moment for the country. They viewed the student movement as an obstacle to that goal 
and dealt with it harshly to prevent embarrassment during the games. During a demonstration at 
Tlatelolco Square, police killed hundreds of people. 
The Mexican people were stunned. Even part of the political elite was alarmed at the 
severity of the crackdown. The student movement and the crackdown brought to the forefront 
the increasing split perceived to exist between the national goals of modernization and equality. 
The students and leftists were objecting to the perceived authoritarian politics and pro-business 
orientation of the government. The political elite was split on how to handle the aftermath of the 
massacre. This was the first significant crisis of governing legitimacy since the Revolution. 
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Shared Developmene3 
The crisis was met with a pledge of 'shared development' by the new president, Luis 
Echeverria (1970-1976). Echeverria asserted that growth could continue while the distribution 
of income was improved. He saw the state as an appropriate tool for accomplishing this agenda. 
Increased spending on services, including education, health, and housing, would help extend the 
benefits of development to more Mexicans. Reducing unemployment was to be a central policy 
goal, accomplished in part through increased public sector investment.24 Echeverria matched the 
leftist rhetoric of the student movement with his own, and though his administration did little to 
curtail the advantages of the business sector, it was quickly dubbed leftist and populist. 
Both Echeverria and his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo, employed a statist-populist model 
of political economy. In Mexico, both populist policies and the active involvement of the state in 
the economy trace back at least as far as the Revolution, so this was n10re a change in emphasis 
than a shift in political philosophy. Whereas the Lopez Mateos and Diaz Ordaz administrations 
were seen to favor modernization and pro-business policies, Echeverria and Portillo were 
perceived to favor equality and populist policies. 
The business sector felt excluded from political dialogue under Echeverria. Just two 
weeks after his inauguration, in Decelnber of 1970, COP ARMEX, an employers' confederation, 
accused the administration of failing to consult the business sector in the development of its 
economic plan, which was both an unprecedented act and charge. Subsequently, different 
factions within the business sector overcame their differences to form the Consejo Coordinador 
Empresarial (CCE), an organization that represents the business sector. The Partido Acci6n 
Nacional (PAN), a party that tends to draw support from the urban middle classes, did well in the 
1973 mid-term elections, and 29% of voters abstained from the 1976 election.25 
In addition to these political problems, a number of economic problems plagued the 
shared development regime. Although growth remained high, from 1970 to 1975, the budget 
deficit grew from 2 to 10 percent of GDP, inflation increased from 5 to 18 percent a year, and the 
current account deficit went from 3 to 5 percent of GDP. The peso became overvalued as 
Mexican inflation outstripped that of the US, but the exchange rate was maintained at 12.5 pesos 
to the dollar. Capital flight became a significant problem. By 1976 these problems had 
accumulated and snowballed, requiring a devaluation of the peso and an IMF financial rescue 
program. After this correction, many of the same problems plagued the Portillo administration 
and contributed to the 1982 crisis. Investigating these issues will contribute to an understanding 
of the failure of the statist-populist model and the shift to the neo-liberal model. 
Agriculture 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Mexico made large investments in agriculture. Increases in 
output and productivity were to be a cornerstone of the lSI program. The growing numbers of 
non-farm workers required increases in food output, and part of the lSI program to spur industry 
was an attempt to supply food at low prices, helping in tum to keep wage costs down. 
Furthermore, food exports would help finance necessary imports of intermediate and capital 
goods. Significant funds were directed into irrigation proj ects, transportation, and 
23 desarrollo compartido 
24 Enriquez, p. 29. 
25 Luke, p. 45-46. 
mechanization. Commercialization was encouraged; the Revolutionary tradition of land 
redistribution and protection of the ejido was deprioritized. This project was largely successful 
and witnessed high returns in the 1950s. 
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The government food procurement agency, CONSUPO, controlled many agricultural 
prices and kept them low. Though this benefited urban workers and in tum their employers, it 
squeezed small farmers. Larger firms could adjust more easily and could access export markets 
as well, and there was a growing gap between agribusiness and the subsistence sector. The 
squeeze on small and subsistence farming, coupled with mechanization, left many in the 
countryside without employment or enough food and income. This contributed to the rapid 
urbanization that occurred in Mexico in the second half of the twentieth century (see table 4). 
This is tum, increased the expenditure burden on the government to provide urban social 
servIces. 
Table 5: Urbanization 








Source: INEGI, Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico. 
By 1965 success in agriculture began to taper off. Low prices deterred private 
investment, and the business sector tended to invest in livestock rather than crops because prices 
were higher in the former. 26 Investments in agriculture had constituted 18 percent of state 
investment in the period 1940-49, but this fell to 9 percent in the mid 1960s.27 Agricultural 
output expansion fell below the rate of popUlation growth in mid 1960s.28 Food export revenues 
disappeared, and Mexico began to import more food. 
An attempt was made to respond to this problem; new investments were made in the 
Echeverria and Portillo years, but the results were not adequate for a number of reasons. Some 
of the funds went into a growing bureaucracy supporting the agricultural sector rather than 
productive investments. The percent of net investment within gross investment declined because 
of depreciation of old investments and increasing use of mechanization (investments in which 
depreciated faster than other projects like irrigation). Cost cutting investments (versus yield 
increasing investments) took up a larger share of allocations than in the past. By the 1970s most 
arable land was in use; whereas previous investments in irrigation yielded large returns by 
increasing the amount of cultivated land, subsequent investments faced diminishing returns with 
respect to fixed land inputs.29 
26 Heath, p. 142. 
27 Fitzgerald, p. 30. 
28 Fitzgerald, p. 25. 
29 Heath, p. 143-145. 
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Industry 
By the 1970s Mexico was suffering from a difficulty with lSI that many countries 
experienced: moving from substitution of light industry to substitution of intermediate and 
capital goods is difficult, requiring a great deal of investment, import of foreign capital goods, 
and skilled labor. For example, according to Clark Reynolds, between 1950 and 1960, in four 
industry sectors--textiles, wood and paper products, chemicals and plastics, and basic metals--the 
ratio of the value of import inputs to value of production increased. 3o The import requirements 
of import competing industries put pressure on the balance of payments--defeating part of the 
original raison d 'etre of the lSI program. 
According to E. V .K. Fitzgerald, the business sector was unwilling to undertake the 
necessary investment to accomplish the next phase of lSI, "preferring the high profits of light 
manufacturing, real estate and tourism." Some orthodox economists argue that the extensive 
government investments 'crowded out' private investment. Whether or not this occurred, it is 
safe to argue that business sector investment was reduced by the weak level of business 
confidence that obtained in the face of the leftist rhetoric of the Echeverria administration--it 
'crowded out' business sector investment. As the Echeverria sexenio progressed, more and more 
funds were diverted to investment abroad rather than direct domestic investment. 
This placed a heavy burden on public investment in the continuation of the lSI program. 
Both the Echeverria and Portillo administrations attempted to allocate sufficient funds to 
accomplish this, and spending on economic investments remained high. This, of course, added 
to the pressure on the budget. 
Fiscal Issues and Problems 
Expenditures 
Government spending increased significantly under Echeverria and Portillo. Some of the 
reasons for this have already been outlined. Much of it was due to the perceived need to respond 
to the crisis of 1968 with increased social spending. This came at a time when other factors were 
causing a need for more spending. The most significant of these were demographic trends. The 
population of Mexico exploded in the 1960s and 1970s (see table 5). This was accompanied by a 
significant trend toward urbanization (see table 4), which was caused in part by the changes in 
agriculture. High levels of unemployment and under-employment existed. This benefited the 
business sector, as an industrial reserve army was available for cheap employment in Mexico's 
burgeoning industry, but it left a large percentage of people in urban areas in poverty. Thus, 
there was a greater need for social services; meanwhile, the expense was greater per capita, as 
urban areas require more spending per capita than do rural areas. 
These increases in social spending were matched by increases in economic spending. 
Both Echeverria and Portillo sought to further industrialization and create new jobs through 
public sector investments. As a part of this, the government incurred significant expense in the 
parastatal sector in the 1970s. Parastatals are state owned and operated enterprises, such as 
PEMEX, the state oil company. A large portion of government investment went into parastatals. 
These investments did not always payoff, for a number of reasons. The most important was that 
30 Reynolds, p. 229. 
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the government kept the prices of parastatal output low in order to subsidize the business sector, 
in part as a component of the lSI program. Another reason was that the government at times 
purchased failing business sector businesses and turned them into parastatals in order to help 
maintain employment levels.3! Under Echeverria the number of para stata Is increased from 86 to 
740.32 This expansion of government enterprises contributed to the perception of the Echeverria 
administration as leftist. 
In 1971, the first year in which Echeverria implemented an economic plan, government 
spending was actually restrained due to a perceived overheating of the economy. The perception 
by 1972 was that the restraint had been too large, and that growth had suffered. This had the 
effect of reducing the weight of those in the administration calling for fiscal responsibility. 33 
Afterwards spending increased sharply (see table 6). 








Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
31 Fitzgerald, p. 34. 
32 Luke, p. 44. 
33 Fitzgerald, p. 40. 









Table 7: Government Spending 
Year Central government Parastatal spending, Total government 
spending, as % of as % of GOPb 
GDpa 


















a: calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 





























c: taken from Newell and Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma. p 279-281. This column does not include state or local 
government expenditures. 
Revenue 
Throughout the period under review, Mexico suffered from an inflexible and inadequate 
revenue structure. Most of the government's revenue collections came from indirect taxes--
which are not elastic, meaning they do not increase as quickly as the growth of the economy. 
They are also regressive, meaning the burden of taxation falls more heavily on the poor than the 
rich. 
In the era of stabilizing development, though the government always ran a deficit, 
increases in spending were roughly held to increases in revenue. In other words, the deficit as a 
percent of GDP remained more or less stable. This was not the case under Echeverria and 
Portillo. The public sector deficit increased in nearly each year of their respective terms (see 
table 7). 
The economic elite was unwilling to accept an increased tax burden. Serious attempts at 
tax reform were blocked by the business sector in 1962 and again by the business sector and the 
Banco de Mexico (central bank) in 1972. The latter objected for fear that a tax increase would 
anger the business sector and cause capital flight. When his plan for tax reform failed, 
Echeverria failed to adequately adjust expenditures. 
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The difference was recovered by borrowing, both domestically and externally (see table 
8). The primary source of deficit financing in the era of stabilizing growth--transfer of reserve 
requirements to the Treasury--was no longer adequate. Many of Mexico's policy makers did not 
believe that deficit spending was necessarily problematic. Indeed, some of them, influenced by 
Ortiz Mena or the hyper-Keynesian n10del, believed it to be necessary. 
Table 8: Government Deficit 
Year Central government budget 
balance, as a percent of GDpa 


















a: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
b: Taken from Newell and Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma. p. 282-283 
Balance including parastatals, 















Table 9: Domestic and Foreign Borrowing 
Year Net domestic borrowing as a Net foreign borrowing as a 
percent of GDP percent of GDP 
Average of Period 1.52 0.42 
1966-1970 
1971 1.02 0.07 
1972 2.41 0.44 
1973 3.62 0.49 
1974 3.10 1.30 
1975 3.65 1.42 
1976 3.68 1.84 
1977 2.97 0.54 
1978 2.78 0.30 
1979 3.36 -0.23 
1980 3.44 -0.07 
1981 4.56 2.11 
1982 13.04 2.42 
1983 4.71 3.27 
1984 5.18 1.99 
1985 7.79 0.65 
Source: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
The Balance of Payments 
In both 1976 and 1982 the crises took shape in the form of balance of payments 
problems. Transactions across borders typically require that one party exchange its domestic 
currency for the currency sought by the other party. For example, to purchase cars from Ford 
Motor Company, a Mexican car dealer must pay for them in dollars, not pesos. If the Mexican 
government borrows dollars it must repay the loan in dollars. In both crises, Mexico did not 
have enough foreign currency to conduct its international transactions. In the most basic sense, it 
was because Mexico earned less foreign currency (from exports and capital flows into the 
country) than it needed to spend (on imports and capital outflow). The Banco de Mexico holds 
foreign currencies and buys or sells then1 as needed to keep international transactions flowing at 
the given exchange rate. These holdings of various currencies are referred to as reserves or 
reserve assets. In both crises, these reserves fell to extremely low levels, and the government 
had to undertake drastic corrective action to ensure the continuation of international transactions. 
The Exchange Rate 
The exchange rate is an important variable in the determination of levels of trade and 
capital flows. It determines the buying power of the peso versus another currency, and vice 
versa. Throughout most of the period 1970-1982, the peso was overvalued, hurting Mexico's 
balance of payments: an overvalued peso makes exports expensive to buyers in other countries 
and imports cheap to Mexican purchasers. 
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Mexico took pride in its currency stability. Public reaction to the devaluation in 1954 had 
been very negative, leaving policymakers with a bias towards maintaining the exchange rate, 
even at high cost. From 1954 to 1976 Mexico n1aintained its exchange rate at 12.5 pesos to the 
dollar. Inflation weakens the buying power of a currency, though, and Mexico's inflation 
outpaced that of the United States in the 1970s, weakening the peso vis-a.-vis the dollar. 
According to Fitzgerald, using the wholesale price index as a guide, the peso was overvalued by 
9 percent in 1970 and by 14 percent in 1975. By the consumer price index, the peso was slightly 
undervalued in 1970 and 27 percent overvalued in 1975.34 
Export Sector 
Mexico's export sector was weak in the 1970s for a number of reasons. As has already 
been mentioned, Mexico's agricultural exports weakened in the 1970s. The government was 
focusing its investments on the lSI program. Though import substitution does not necessarily 
conflict with the stimulation of exports, in practice the new industries had difficulty tapping 
export markets, and less funds were available for targeting improvements in the export sector. 
Mexico's main trading partner, the United States, exhibits a large amount of import volatility. 
When the U.S. economy into a recession, its imports are greatly reduced. This leaves the 
fate of Mexico's export success largely subject to forces beyond its control. The 1970s were a 
turbulent decade for the U.S. economy and, in tum, for Mexico's export sector. The crises in 
both 1976 and 1982 were exacerbated by a U.S. recession. 
One response to these problems has been the development of export industries on the 
U.S. border, also known as maquiladoras, that process imported materials for export, with this 
occurring mostly to and from the United States. The sector was stimulated by tariff free status in 
the mid 1960s and a tax rebate scheme that started in 1973.35 Though very small in the mid 
1960s, this sector grew to account for two-thirds of Mexico's manufactured exports by 1980.36 
This sector, which has increased in size and significance since the 1982 Debt Crisis, has 
some problems. First, a number of environmental and social concerns have developed regarding 
the sector. Second, while the static gains from trade in this sector can be large, it is not a 
dynamic source of growth in the economy: there are few linkages with other domestic 
businesses.37 Third, most of the raw materials used in the maquiladoras are imported, negating 
part of the benefit of investments in the industry in terms of the balance of payments. 
Import Sector 
While Mexico's export sector faced these difficulties, imports were booming. The 
overvaluation of the peso made imports cheap in relative terms. Some food items had to be 
imported because of the failure of the agricultural sector to increase output in line with the 
increase in popUlation. The attempt to expand the lSI program to intermediate and capital goods 
necessitated the import of large amounts of capital goods. 
34 Fitzgerald, p. 44. 
35 Kim, p. 210. 
36 Kim, p. 209. 
37 Kim, p. 223. 
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In the 1970s growth and domestic demand were high in Mexico. While the lSI program 
stumbled, demand for intermediate and capital goods remained high--and what domestic industry 
failed to produce, Mexicans imported. In 1973 Mexico was still a net oil importer and suffered 
both the increased expense of oil and the inflationary aspects of the price hike.38 
In the Portillo administration, import tariffs were reduced across the board (see table 9). 
This was in part a response to the criticism of orthodox economists and the business sector. With 
the overvalued exchange rate and high domestic demand, this led to a tremendous increase in 
imports. Imports increased three times in real terms from 1977 to 1981.39 
Table 10: Average Import Tariff Rate 



















Source: Newell and Rubio, Mexico's Dilemma. p 296. 
Capital Account 
h1 addition to the difference between exports and in1ports, the balance of payments is 
influenced by the inflows and outflows of capitaL Capital outflow occurs in different forms, 
Mexicans can exchange pesos for other currencies and purchase foreign assets or hold other 
currencies in foreign banks. Repayment of foreign debt must be made in the currency of the 
country from which funds were borrowed. Foreign investors can, with great ease, sell existing 
portfolio investments (e.g. stocks, bonds) or, with more difficulty, direct investments (e.g. 
factories). All of these transactions increase the demand for dollars sought for exchange with 
pesos. 
38 Lustig, p. 20 
39 Kim, p. 212. 
In the period under review, Mexican banks offered dollar denominated accounts. This 
meant that capital 'flight' could occur without funds leaving the country, through the simple 
exchange of pesos for dollars within Mexico. Middle class savers in particular made use of 
these, including sometimes to protect themselves from feared devaluations. 
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Both capital flight and use of Mexdollar accounts had deleterious effects beyond those on 
the balance of payments. They reduced the funds available for business sector loans (Mexdollar 
accounts had 1000/0 reserve requirements). They also decreased the amount captured by the 
Banco De Mexico through reserve requirements and in tum reducing the amount transferred to 
the Treasury to finance the deficit--which contributed to the need for borrowing.4o 
Capital can also enter the country through the same mechanisms with the processes 
reversed. In Mexico in the period 1970-1982, external borrowing was a significant source of 
capital inflow (see table 8). 
A number of factors influence the flow of capital into and out of a country. The expected 
return on an investment is an important factor. High interest rates or expected profit levels will 
attract capital to a country. Inflation mitigates these gains: the real interest rate, versus the 
nominal rate, must be considered in determining the impact on capital flows. Capital movements 
also occur for non-economic reasons, such as concerns about political stability or government 
policies. These factors could perhaps be summed up under the appellation 'investor confidence.' 
As mentioned, investor confidence was low during the Echeverria and Portillo administrations. 
In the period under review, few or no obstacles to capital movements or currency 
conversion were in place in Mexico. Mexicans viewed these free movements as an economic 
right and curbing them would have been politically difficult if not impossible. At least as far 
back the Mexican Revolution, capital flight has been a mechanism by which the economic elite 
protected itself from instability and uncertainty or voted against policies it opposed. 41 Though 
the economic consequences are always potentially far-reaching, this phenomenon was often 
motivated or exacerbated by policy concerns outside of the economic arena. When economic 
crises did occur, capital flight often worsened and perpetuated them. Capital movements have 
become larger over time, increasing their significance. 
The combination of a fixed exchange rate and free capital movements can become 
problematic. If it becomes clear that the exchange rate is out of alignment, a number of 
problems can occur. If the peso is overvalued, in time the government will have to either 
intervene to bring it back into alignment or devalue the currency. Fear of devaluation will 
encourage holders of pesos to exchange them for dollars or dollar assets. This will put further 
pressure on the peso, as demand for the dollar increases and demand for the peso decreases. This 
increases the need for devaluation, and the circle continues with even greater fervor. If this cycle 
grows out of hand, it may lead to a need to devalue, even if the currency could previously have 
been bolstered. Many developing countries have had this problem. In 1976 Mexico joined their 
ranks. 
There were three main sources of pressure on the peso that led to crisis in both 1976 and 
1982: the current account deficit, external debt service, and capital flight (see table 10). The first 
two of these are not particularly difficult to measure. Capital flight, though, is difficult to 
measure. The term is not synonymous with capital outflow, something that happens at all times 
in all countries. It refers to those capital outflows that occur in a time of crisis. As mentioned, it 
also contributes to crisis. It is difficult in practice to distinguish between 'normal' capital flows 
40 Luke, p. 44-45. 




and capital flight brought on by crisis. Table 10 gives measurements from two sources. One 
generic method of measuring capital flight is to use the 'errors and omissions' portion of the 
balance of payn1ents as a proxy. This portion is used to offset the discrepancies in the staten1ent, 
which is required to balance total inflows and total outflows--it reflects, as the name indicates, 
capital flows that were not measured. Thus, 'errors and omissions' is sometin1es used as a proxy 
for capital flight because it captures irregularities. However, it should not be thought of as an 
accurate or complete measure. The fourth column gives capital flight estimates from an article 
by Edward Buffie and Allen Krause. 
Table 11: Sources of currency pressure 
Year Current Account External Debt 
Balance as % of Service as a 0/0 
GDpa ofGDpb 
Average 






1975 -4.59 2.82 
1976 -3.84 4.08 
1977 -2.26 6.36 
1978 -3.09 7.37 
1979 -4.06 8.35 
1980 -5.78 5.15 
1981 -6.70 4.45 
1982 -3.78 7.09 
1983 3.79 10.43 
1984 2.39 8.09 
1985 0.61 6.93 
Source: 
a: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
b: Calculated from OECD, External Debt Statistics. 
'Errors and 
Omissions' as 































c: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. A negative number indicates capital outflow. 
d: Taken from Buffie and Krause, "Mexico 1958-86," A negative number indicates capital inflow. 
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1976 Crisis and Devaluation: 'Flotar Como una Piedra,42 
Many of the problems outlined so far in this paper gathered momentum during the 
Echeverria administration and built to crisis proportions by 1976. The overvaluation of the 
exchange rate increased. The fiscal deficit ballooned and external debt increased--in tum 
increasing the burden of debt servicing. The current account deficit widened. Investor 
confidence--shaken by Echeverria's leftist rhetoric, the fiscal deficit, inflation, negative real 
interest rates after 1973, etc.--plummeted, and capital flight became an increasingly large 
problem (see table 10). Deposits in Mexdollar accounts increased, especially in 1975 when 
devaluation seemed immanent. Mexdollar accounts accounted for only 4 percent of total money 
stock in the early 1970s, but 15 percent of the money supply was contained in Mexdollar 
accounts by August of 1975.43 
Echeverria resisted a devaluation. The PRI perceived that a devaluation would weaken 
support from labor and believed it needed strong labor support in the face of weakening business 
sector support. Further, Echeverria perceived the capital flight to be a temporary political 
problem that would go away. Reserves were maintained through external borrowing.44 The 
objective in so doing was to finance imports and maintain debt servicing, but the effect was to 
also finance capital flight. 45 
By 1976 reserves had fallen to unacceptable levels, and it was clear that a large correction 
would be necessary. Echeverria bowed to pressure to leave incoming President Jose Lopez 
Portillo with a clean slate. The peso was allowed to float against the dollar, and it depreciated 
substantially. Mexico requested access to IMF resources, and an IMF stabilization program was 
negotiated and accepted. 
The IMF argued that the devaluation alone was not enough to solve the balance of 
payments problem. The response of imports to a change in the exchange rate was less than that 
of exports. Both the elasticity effect--price adjustment--and the absorption effect--demand 
management--needed to be utilized. Aggregate demand had to be reduced to close the balance of 
payments deficit, primarily by reducing import demand and slowing inflation. 
A number of other measures could have been taken. Import restrictions could have 
reduced or eliminated the current account deficit. Capital controls could have limited capital 
outflow. Exchange restrictions could have helped maintain reserve levels. None of these options 
suited the IMF. According to Fitzgerald, since the IMF "assumed that tax reforms, suspension of 
convertibility, control over capital movements and import controls are not politically feasible or 
economically desirable (as the IMF does), then the budget deficit is indeed the only variable 
open to government control." This does not mean, though, that government spending or external 
debt were the only causes of the balance of payments crisis and that reducing them yields a 
complete solution. The IMF preferred solutions consistent with orthodox economics and with its 
mandate to expand international trade. 
The IMF requirements for access to its funds were not stringent in comparison to its 
subsequent programs in Mexico and elsewhere. The IMF required that by 1979 the public sector 
deficit be reduced to 2.5 percent of GDP, that public sector saving to rise to 5.5 of GDP, and that 
42 After the 1976 devaluation in which the peso was allowed to float against the dollar, it was commonly said in 
Mexico that the peso "floated like a rock" Fitzgerald, p. 61. 
43 Luke, p. 74. 
44 Fitzgerald, p. 42. 
45 ibid, p. 46. 
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extenlal borrowing to fall to 1 % ofGDP. No large spending cuts or privatizations were required. 
Despite the loose tenns of credit, though, Mexico would soon cancel its IMF program. 
Administering the Abundance 
Jose Lopez Portillo started his administration as had Echeverria--scrambling for 
legitimacy, especially with the business sector and the middle classes. Within a year, though, 
Mexico and Portillo seemed to be sitting pretty. The devaluation slowed import growth. Exports 
had picked up--the US economy had revived and was importing more Mexican products.46 
But the real change was oil. In the first year of his administration Portillo announced that 
the level of proven oil reserves and suspected oil reserves in Mexico had both increased 
substantially. This drastically changed Mexico's economic picture. Suddenly Mexico's concern 
was not to make difficult decisions on the distribution of scarce resources, but, as Portillo put it, 
to "administer the abundance." 
Portillo attempted to use the oil revenue to accomplish what Echeverria had failed to do: 
bridge the apparent divide that had fonned between, on the one hand, Mexico's business sector 
and the goal ofmodemization and, on the other, labor, peasants, and the goal of economic 
justice. Portillo responded to the business sector and orthodox critics in a number of ways. He 
initiated an "Alliance for Production" meant to elevate the role of business sector in the 
development strategy. It included lower taxes on reinvested profits.47 Various tax incentives 
were offered for investment, including accelerated depreciation and tax credits for new 
investments. Real wage growth was held below output growth from 1977-1979. Mexico's 
import ·duties were reduced on the average (see table 9). Each of these policies added to the 
fiscal deficit. 
Meanwhile, social spending also continued to increase (see table 6). Though oil revenues 
increased in each year of Portillo's administration, spending increased faster (see table 7). The 
difference, of course, was made up through borrowing. The increase in oil wealth was used to 
justify the increases in public indebtedness, including to foreign banks. Though in hindsight the 
extent of this indebtedness clearly grew to be unreasonable, at the time there seemed little reason 
for concern. Mexico's ratio of external debt to oil reserves fell from 32 percent in 1976 to 4 
percent in 1982.48 At the time it was believed that oil prices could only go up. 
Growth was high during most of the Portillo administration, but a nUlnber of problems 
presented themselves (see table 12). As mentioned, the fiscal deficit grew to massive 
proportions. The rate of growth of the money supply increased substantially. Mexico continued 
to have difficulty with the transition in the lSI program to intennediate and capital goods and 
faced supply bottlenecks. These factors all contributed to high inflation rates (see table 12). 
Exports faced the same difficulties as during the Echeverria sexenio. With high aggregate 
demand, import demand was high. As Mexican inflation outpaced U.S. inflation during the 
sexenio, the exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. Thus, when import restrictions were 
reduced, imports skyrocketed--imports increased three times in real tenns from 1977 to 1981, 
and substantial trade deficits persisted despite oil revenues. In the same period consumer goods 
increased from 6 percent of the import total to 12 percent.49 
46 ibid, p. 53. 
47 Luke, p. 50-51. 
48 Luke, p. 41. 
49 Kim, p. 212. 
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The intlation problem was answered by an increase in reserve requirements. This limited private 
credit, leading to increased external financing by the non-bank business sector. External 
financing of imports was also attractive because of domestic inflation. This increase in external 
debt by the business sector increased the need for foreign exchange. 
Table 12: Oil Prices and Production 
Year A verage Price of Index of Production of Crude 
Crude Petroleum on Petroleum in Mexico 
the World Market, 
$ per barrel 
1970 2.11 25.2 
1971 2.57 25.8 
1972 2.80 27.3 
1973 3.14 27.7 
1 11.22 31.7 
1975 10.60 35.2 
1976 11.83 38.6 
1977 12.84 43.8 
1978 12.95 50.4 
1979 29.22 57.8 
1980 35.48 71.0 
1981 34.12 80.3 
1982 31.38 98.7 
1983 28.37 96.6 
1984 28.25 100.4 
1985 26.98 100.0 
1986 13.82 96.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
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Table 13: Economic performance under Echeverria and Portillo 
Year Real GDP, 0/0 Real GDP per Wholesale Consumer 
increase capita, 0/0 Prices, 0/0 Prices, 0/0 
increase increase increase 
1971 3.4 -0.02 3.8 5.5 
1972 7.3 3.7 2.7 4.9 
1973 7.6 3.96 15.8 12.0 
1974 5.9 2.3 22.5 23.8 
1975 5.1 0.6 10.5 15.7 
1976 2.1 -1.4 22.3 15.1 
Echeverria 
Sexenio 5.23 1.52 12.93 12.83 
Average 
(1971-76) 
1977 3.0 -0.6 41.1 29.0 
1978 8.3 5.2 15.8 17.5 
1979 9.2 6.2 18.8 17.5 
1980 8.3 5.0 25.0 25.7 
1981 7.9 5.4 24.2 28.0 
1982 -0.6 -2.8 55.9 59.7 
Lopez Portillo 
Sexenio 6.01 3.07 30.13 29.57 
Average (1977-
1982) 
Source: Calculated from IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
Deja Vu All Over Again 
Despite these problems, Portillo's economic strategy might have succeeded due to the 
sheer size of the potential oil wealth, but three unexpected events catalyzed a spiral that led to 
crisis: oil prices fell, U.S. interest rates increased, and capital flight of massive proportions took 
place. 
The 1981 budget was planned with an expected 75 percent increase in oil exports at a 10 
percent increase in dollar price on the previous year,50 At the time it was believed that oil prices 
could only get higher. However, many of the major economies were in recession, reducing 
demand for oil. The volume of exports increased only 33 percene 1 and the dollar price actually 
fell (see table 10). This, of course, resulted in a large gap between expected earnings of dollars 
and actual earnings. 
The U.S. was in recession from 1980 to 1982. Most observers expected the U.S. to lower 
interest rates to stimulate the economy. However, inflation was high, and the experience of the 
1970s and the increased influence of monetarism both contributed to a bias toward taming 
50 Luke, p. 64. 
51 Luke, p. 64. 
I 
inflation, even at high cost. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates in 1981, even though this 
deepened the recession. This increased Mexico's cost of external borrowing and reduced 
exports. Domestically, interest rates also had to be raised to fight inflation and slow capital 
flight, increasing the cost of borrowing within Mexico. 
Capital flight in 1981 and 1982 occurred on a crippling scale (see table 10). Use of 
Mexdollar accounts increased, and by the end of 1981, they accounted for percent of the 
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money supply. 52 Given the overvaluation of the peso, another devaluation was feared. Mexicans 
turned to dollars and dollar assets to protect themselves. As more capital left the country and 
external borrowing increased, there was greater pressure on the peso, and greater fear of 
devaluation. This, of course, spurred more capital flight. Mexico suffered from the same 
destructive cycle witnessed in the 1976 crisis. The business sector and the middle classes voted 
their pocketbooks--against the statist-populist regimes of Echeverria in 1976 and Portillo in 
1982. 
By February of 1982, it was evident that a crisis was at hand, and the peso was devalued 
by 40 percent. Interest rates and reserve requirements were raised to stem inflation. 5000 
products became subject to price controls. New incentives to exports and tourism were 
announced and the prices of para statal products were raised.53 
Nonetheless, the response of the government was not adequate. The 1982 budget was 
supposed to bring down spending, but the deficit climbed again, in part because wages of public 
employees were raised. The February devaluation had the effect of increasing the expense of 
dollar denominated debt servicing, and the increase in interest rates had the effect of raising the 
cost of domestic borrowing by the government. Capital flight continued, both out of the country 
and into Mexdollar accounts. Foreign banks stopped lending to Mexico on favorable terms--
loans were short tern1 with high interest rates. 54 The perception that the governn1ent continued to 
mismanage the economy contributed to still more capital flight. The pressures on the peso were 
still significant, and Mexico could no longer sustain external borrowing to bolster reserves. 
In August the finance minister announced a three-month suspension of repayment of 
principle on foreign debt. There was another devaluation that entailed the creation of a new two-
tier exchange system. Mexdollar accounts were forcibly converted into pesos at an unfavorable 
rate, instantly erasing a substantial portion of the savings of the middle class. In Septerrlber the 
government instituted foreign exchange controls and nationalized the banks. 55 These steps, of 
course, infuriated the business sector and the middle classes. 
Analysis and Conclusions 
Under Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, Mexico shifted to a neo-liberal regin1e, which it has 
employed to the present day. The lSI program was abandoned, and the government shifted its 
focus to stimulating the export sector. The role of the government in the economy was 
significantly reduced. Many state-owned enterprises were sold. Government spending was 
reduced. The trade account was further liberalized, and Mexico joined GATT. Why did this 
shift occur? 
In short, it was because of the rejection of the statist-populist model employed by the 
52 Luke, p. 66. 
53 Luke, p. 68-70. 
54 Luke, p. 68-70. 
55 Luke, p. 68-70. 
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administrations of Echeverria and Portillo. Why, then, did the statist-populist model collapse? 
In the immediate sense, it was the debt crisis that killed the model. Thus, part of the explanation 
of the shift can be found in the reasons the debt crisis occurred. 
One set of contributing causes for the crisis is that general economic conditions in the 
United States were unfavorable in the period 1970-1982 when compared with the 1960s and the 
rest of the 1980s. This had a large effect on Mexico because of the extent of its trade with the 
U.S. Growth in the United States was weak and erratic. In tum, Mexico's exports faced 
unfavorable conditions. U.S. inflation was higher than in the 1960s or the 1980s; Mexico 
imported it. Interest rates were unfavorable, particularly in the period immediately before the 
Debt Crisis. 
In the 1970s Mexico faced political constraints on its economic policy that were more 
severe than in the past. Answering the 1968 crisis through an increase in social spending and 
public investment seemed to be a political necessity. At the same time, the Echeverria 
administration could not gather enough momentum to implement its plan to raise taxes in 1972, 
leaving a revenue gap that caused inflation, exchange rate instability, and increased debt, both 
internal and external. The budget deficit and its effects further undermined the support of the 
business sector and contributed to both capital flight and speculation against the peso; these latter 
two phenomena reinforced each other. 
In addition to these problems, both administrations made many mistakes. Echeverria's 
strong leftist rhetoric may have helped to appease some of the frustrations that exploded in the 
1968 crisis, but it weakened investor confidence significantly. Ironically, the Gini concentration 
actually increased under Echeverria (see table 2). This underscores the importance of perception 
with regard to economic policy: it was the leftist rhetoric, more so than a state program of 
redistribution (the opposite occurred), that dampened investment and led to capital flight. 
Portillo failed to distance himself from Echeverria's image and suffered the same problems. 
Another significant mistake, which should actually be largely blamed on previous 
administrations, was the failure to slow popUlation growth (see table 5). Any country's economy 
would have difficulty creating enough new jobs, producing enough food, and building enough 
schools, etc., to service Mexico's rate of population increase. In strictly economic terms, this 
was a tremendous blunder. In reality, of course, other factors have to be considered. The 
powerful Catholic Church, along with many Mexicans, objected to birth control. Not until 1972 
did the government take steps to increase the use of birth control and family planning.56 
Further, the oil wealth was not used effectively. According to Paul Luke, the problem 
was that the revenues generated from oil sales were thought of as income rather than wealth. 
The money was used for domestic spending. Though some of this spending went to economic 
investment, these funds were not focused on generating foreign exchange, in part because of the 
continued program of industrialization. Projects in the non-traded sector did not contribute to the 
current account. The overvalued exchange rate made investments in non-traded goods more 
profitable than traded goods.57 An alternative would have been to focus on investments, both 
domestic and particularly in other countries, which could have generated foreign exchange on a 
steady basis.58 
Portillo's choice to liberalize trade with an overvalued exchange rate led to a massive 
increase in imports and widening of the current account deficit. It is also clear that Mexico's 
56 Meyer, p. 689-90. 
57 Luke, p. 57-58. 
58 Luke, p. 42. 
fiscal deficits and external borrowing were both too large. Whether or not one accepts deficit 
spending as an appropriate policy at times, Mexico stretched it to unreasonable levels. 
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These mistakes all contributed to the belief that the statist-populist model employed 
heterodox, or simply bad, economics. In the 1970s, orthodoxy had strengthened within the 
economics profession in the United States and in policy circles in many countries. The 
Washington Consensus was a product of this and became an ideological icon and weapon. 
Economic programs were categorized as either free or unfree, market led or statist, export 
oriented or import substituting, fiscally conservative or fiscally irresponsible, right or left, and, 
essentially, right or wrong. This coincided with trends towards technocratization in Mexico and 
academic training of Mexican leaders and bureaucrats in the United States. 
Against this backdrop, the business sector and middle classes voiced their increasing 
displeasure through capital flight. This reduced the funds available for domestic investment and 
put pressure on the peso. Clearly the current account deficits and the servicing of external debt 
also put a great deal of pressure on the peso (see table 10), and, as discussed, policy mistakes 
contributed to these. It is important to note, though, that while much of the external debt was 
contracted for the purpose of bolstering external reserves, the practical effect was to finance 
capital flight. In other words, Mexicans were only able to exchange pesos for dollars so long as 
the government maintained sufficient reserves to continue to sustain such international 
transactions. Thus, much of the burden of debt servicing should in fact be attributed to capital 
flight--otherwise the significance of external debt itself is easily exaggerated. Capital flight (and 
the external borrowing that financed it) could have been stemmed through exchange or capital 
controls, but the government failed to do this--in part because of the existing influence of the 
business sector and middle classes. This financial voting procedure sounded the death knell of 
the statist-populist model and sounded the bugle call for the inauguration ofneo-liberal policies. 
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